Cap-and-Trade Properties under Different Scheme Designs
Georg Grüll and Luca Taschini
This paper examines the key design mechanisms of existing and proposed cap-and-trade markets. First, it is shown that the hybrid systems under investigation (safety-valve with offsets, price floor using a subsidy, price collar, allowance reserve, and options offered by the regulator) can be decomposed into a combination of an ordinary cap-and-trade scheme with European- or American-style call and put options. Then, we quantify and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed hybrid schemes by investigating whether pre-set objectives (enforcement of permit price bounds and reduction of potential costs for relevant companies) can be accomplished while maintaining the original environmental targets.
Keywords: Allowance reserve, Price ceiling, Price collar, Price floor, Safety valve.
JEL Classifications: H23, Q28, Q54, Q58.